In September 2015 the European Commission issued proposals for reforming the mechanism for resolving state-investor disputes related to an investment treaty: the principle consists of establishing a new jurisdictional system composed of a permanent court whose judges are appointed by the states and endowed with an appeal chamber. It is this new mechanism, called the Investment Court System (ICS) or the multilateral Investment Court (MIC), which was inserted in February 2016 into the trade agreement being negotiated between the European Union and Canada (CETA), replacing the former investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS).

The adoption of the Investment Court System, provided for in CETA, is currently suspended pending a possible decision by the European Union Court of Justice. Last October, the Walloons obtained a ruling from the European Council that the Belgian federal government could refer the matter to the European Court of Justice on the compatibility of this new system with the European Union’s legal system.

The MIC is generally adopted to address what is refered to as the ‘legitimacy crisis of the ISDS’. a system that was long criticised for its lack of coherence, predictability, and biased arbitrators. This is promised through reforms such as replacing ad hoc arbitrators with permanent judges. All and all, the reforms suggested by the MIC proposal are mere replacements of the type of decision-makers in investor-state disputes. These very reforms raise concerns related to the impartiality of judges similar to those directed towards the ISDS where it is not clear how judges chosen by the British, Egyptian or Russian governments would prove to be impartial in CETA-based disputes, given that the mere difference of nationality is not enough to eliminate the possibility of bias and partiality and vice versa.

This essay will argue that the proposed MIC system will fail to reform the alleged ISDS legitimacy crisis by arguing for the MIC’s failure to resolve the issue of bias and partiality of its would-be judges, as well as arguing that the MIC system will kill the Most Favored Nation (MFN) advantages by creating a system where the state polices the investors dispute resolution options and that the ISDS – flawed as it may be – is effectively presenting guarantees for state sovereignty and investors interests.

The essay will start with the exploration of the issue of partiality and bias of ad-hoc arbitrators, how the issue may persist under the MIC, and how the current ISDS proposes guarantees to the issue. Then, the essay will address how the MFN is an advantage that is essential for investments and related disputes and how it will be obliterated by the lack of solutions of the MIC, and finally, the essay will explain how the ISDS preservation of guarantees for state sovereignty and investors rights. The essay will conclude with a statement on how the ISDS shall remain in force and may not be replaced by the MIC.

The MIC will not be able to solve the issue of arbitrators’ partiality and partiality and bias, even if we replace them with judges.

No safeguards are proposed to avoid the select club of arbitrators that currently decides many investor-state dispute settlements, even though they have been a driving force in the resurgence of arbitration.

According to Jose Zárate (2018), CETA has failed to show that MIC judges would be impartial, independent, and free of political or economic bias “To the contrary, knowing that a state’s past behavior is the best predictor of its future behavior, one could predict that future negotiations of a MIC would be tainted by illegitimate and antidemocratic means”[1]

of investor-state dispute resolution, even though they have been a driving force in the resurgence of investment arbitration.

It is critical to state that the negotiations for CETA are claiming that the pro-investment judges are the best placed to settle these disputes. I, however, strongly disagree as the transparency of these judges is always questioned and the ability of these judges to do the job is always questioned since it is not possible to say that these judges today are too different from other arbitrators. that is to say nothing proves that they are less effective than them. this evident by the lack of any material guarantees to impartiality as depicted in the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration.

Moreover, the EU stands for the argument that the establishment of a multilaterally agreed-upon system for investment dispute resolution with a permanent body of judges could provide a significant degree of predictability and coherence. To that end, the EU criticizes the current ISDS framework for its lack of fairness and preservation of the right of public authorities to regulate.

This is a downside for the MIC proposal as, and as viewed by Zárate (2018), this argument along with the ISDS system’s criticism for lack of neutrality and consistency is a mere indicator of the lack of confidence in the arbitral college that explains why the EU’s first step was to use its institutional power to remove the ISDS rulings from private hands to a public body. 

The very claim by the EU made many countries – without any basis – admit that the ISDS framework has deficiencies in its legitimacy, neutrality, transparency, consistency, and costs and that a policy will need to be undertaken soon to try to solve these deficiencies.

One questions arise from the ‘call to reform’ that the EU proposes: Does the replacement of arbitrators by rather specialized judges reflect a certain efficiency?

the answer is simple, All of these elements indicate a strong continuity with the current system rather than an attempt to reform it.

Moreover, the European Union will not let the chance to control the members of the court go into its hands.

In other words, the EU’s proposal would not change the treaties’ asymmetric conditions, such as the provisions that allow developed countries to have control over the members of the court through their appointment and veto, which will endanger their independence and impartiality.

MIC will not be able to provide the MFN advantages.

The MFN clause allows its beneficiary to claim more advantageous treatment, granted by the granting state to a third state, in a treaty.

Its extension to dispute settlement mechanisms cover a new dimension that is related to “unilateral transnational arbitration” – that is, the possibility offered to the investor to unilaterally refer a dispute to the possibility for an investor to unilaterally refer a dispute to an arbitral tribunal based on a BIT.

In the eyes of Stephan W. Schill (2017)[2], the advent of MFN arbitration under ICSID, for example, has been fostered mainly by a combination of several factors: the existence of a highly dynamic network of BITs the propensity to insert indirect clauses in BITs and the spectacular development of investment litigation.

From my point of view, arbitration, through the MFN clause, follows the same path as unilateral arbitration, which can be said to be one of the manifestations. In this context, a gradual analysis of the context of emergence and the conditions of implementation of unilateral arbitration has led to a particularly significant finding as to the existence of a dependent relationship between the extension of the MFN clause and unilateral arbitration. Meaning that it has been held and recognized the ruling of Mafizini v. Spain[3] that the more favourable conditions of access to unilateral arbitration given in a treaty with one country could be invoked by nationals of other countries whose treaty contains the MFN clause, the more the investors – of both countries – would have trust in the system.

The resurgence of the MFN clause, in the restricted field of ICSID arbitration proceedings, stems from the more general problem of adapting procedural law to the pace of transformation of investor relations. It also stems from a need to unify the rules governing investment matters. Hence, I find it critical to state that thanks to the proliferation of BITs, most of which incorporate “indirect” clauses, the MFN clause contributes to reinforcing the systematic recourse against the State instituted by unilateral arbitration. Like a dwarf perched on the shoulders of a giant, the extension of the MFN clause to the rules of the procedure allows unilateral transnational arbitration to have an additional effect on the expansion of the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. Therefore, the tempering of the principle of automatic extension of the MFN clause by some courts is rather welcome.

It should be noted, however, that the solutions of the case in which the principle is not applied should not be interpreted as a denial of its existence or a claim of the failure of the system that allows it to breathe (the ISDS in this case). As its legal basis is proven, the restrictions imposed by the courts deserve to be reconsidered to symmetrically take into account the interests of the parties. All in all, it can be said that modern investment law – to the strengthening of which BITs, regional treaties, and arbitration awards contribute – embodies a trend in the air of the times. The extension of the MFN clause to dispute settlement mechanisms is probably the most current response to the concern for harmonization of the rules governing international investment. A response that will be killed by the black and white of the MIC.

THE ISDS SYSTEM FRAMEWORK BALANCES STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INVESTORS INTERESTS.

The investor-state dispute settlement mechanism raises multiple questions.

One of which is the question of the hindrance to the sovereignty of the State, and more precisely to its capacity to legislate – because of the pressure that the investor can exert on the host state of the investment – constitutes the most vivid objection to the ISDS mechanism by states. Nevertheless, this “leash” on states is a guarantee to the investors’ rights against entities that will not hesitate to use their upper hand to realize minor or major interests on the account of the investors. It is alleged that ISDS clauses violate the principles of equality of citizens and non-discrimination, given that the mechanism is open only to foreign investors.

This very criticism – considerable as it may be – is a testament to the ISDS system’s capability to balance the investors’ needs and interests against the state sovereignty, putting a blockade on the state’s capability to monopolize a positive law due to being restricted by the rules contained in BITs.

As Sornarajah (2006)[4] believes; if these rules are likely to weaken the legislative or jurisdictional dimension of the receiving State, one of the most critical concerns of states is the fact that, on many occasions, arbitration practice has favored the protection of private operators at the expense of the general interest.

However, I would strongly de-escalate this concern as due to recent developments in case law and treaty provisions, we are now witnessing a rebalancing of the rights and obligations of investors and host countries. Based on this observation and in light of the study of the rules arising from these agreements, this contribution aims to demonstrate that while continuing to offer protection to foreign operators, these bilateral treaties tend to safeguard State sovereignty as well.

Conclusion

As the paper explained, it is clear that issues that the MIC is proposed in order to deal with are matters of enhancement not reformation. Partiality and bias of ad-hoc arbitrators could be enhanced with better selection and appointment guarantees rather than an absolute change of direction. It is also critical that the ISDS remain in force as it guarantees the pinnacle of equality between the investor and the state, the MFN clause. Nevertheless, the ISDS is effectively preserving the rights of both states and investors. Just because states are less possible to emerge victorious from the ISDS, does not mean that the system is entirely flawed beyond usage. Enhancement of the ISDS is a more acceptable and practical solution.

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[1] Legitimacy Concerns of the Proposed Multilateral Investment Court: Is Democracy Possible? José Manuel Alvarez Zárate.

[2] Schill, Stephan W., Maffezini v. Plama: Reflections on the Jurisprudential Schism in the Application of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Matters of Dispute Settlement (February 23, 2017). In Meg Kinnear et al (eds), Building International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2016) 251-265, Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 2017-11, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2017-12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922542

[3] Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7

[4] Sornarajah, M. A law for need or a law for greed?: Restoring the lost law in the international law of foreign investment. Int Environ Agreements 6, 329–357 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-006-9016-0

Introduction

When Cyrus the Great conquered the city of Babylon in 539 BCE, he did the unexpected — in that era — when he freed all slaves and granted the people the right to choose their religion. These two actions were followed by the creation of the Cyrus Cylinder, a clay tablet containing his statement, which constitutes the first-ever human rights declaration in history.

The fundamental concept of human rights organizations:

The concept of human rights, as envisioned by Cyrus, quickly spread to India, Greece and eventually Rome. Since the time of Cyrus, there many instruments that address the issues of human rights. These include; Prophet Mohamed’s Farwell Address (632 AD-Prophet Mohamed’s assertion of equality between all people of all races), the Magna Carta (1215 AD-asserted the people’s rights and made the king of England subject of law), the Petition of Rights (1628 AD), the United States Declaration of Independence (1776 AD-proclaimed the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness), the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789 AD-A product of the French National Constituent Assembly amid the French revolution that stated that all citizens are equal under the law), and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948 AD-The first document listing the 30 rights to which everyone is entitled). The ideas set out in these instruments played a major role in igniting the spark of the modern human rights era in the 1960s following Dr. Martin Luther King Jr’s-lead Civil Rights Movement.

Following the 1960s, the interest groups that operate in the field of human rights groups have grown exponentially, with the current landscape being a loose coalition of international organizations, national organizations, and international networks that include thousands of domestic and international groups. Eventually, these interest groups  to see themselves as advocates of a fundamental and often forgotten dutythat is the protection of the fundamentals of human. Alas, in the largest sense, they merely undertake to resolve policy issues. This very task resulted in many organizations relying on public support to expose human rights violations by targeting ‘oppressing’ authorities.

In this paper, I will first explain the snowball effect of the funding issue, which results in a shift in the human rights groups and politicizes it. Second, I attempt to explain special interest groups descend into funding-induced politics. Finally, I will detail how do interest groups play a political role, and demonstrate through practical examples the suspicious action of these organizations that deviate from the role of protecting human rights.

This paper showcases the historical development of the concept of human rights and the inevitable role of protection that is required in order to prevent the violation of human rights. In addition, this paper provides a wide-ranging exploration of well-known non-governmental organizations with focus of the impact of politics on human rights organizations and the role they are bound to play once they accept the ‘political funding’.

Non-Governmental Organizations, Their Role, and Needs:

Non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) IS the common form of a group of citizens grabbing the attention of the international community on human rights issues. NGOs often overstep their roles as watchdogs who monitor the actions of governments. This results in the NGOs engagement in a seemingly opposing role against world governments for demands and claims for abiding and respecting human rights principles.

Nevertheless, when examining some groups of interest such as Children’s Defense Fund, Human Rights Watch, and Huan Rights Action Cneter, it became clear that each one of them adopts different tactics to realize its demands, based on the area of human rights that it addresses.

An example could be drawn from Amnesty International, a global movement of people who defend the universally recognized human rights of all people. With more than 2.2 million members and supporters in over 150 countries, the organization seeks to prevent and end grave abuses of human rights and to demand justice for those whose rights have been violated[1]. To that end, Amnesty International is known for adopting a legal-focused approach to defending and representing prisoners of thought. Focusing on the safety and security of key human rights defenders.

Moreover, The Children’s Defense Fund (“CDF”), a children’s advocacy organization that aims to create a level playing field for all children, adopts a more social-political role of advocating for regulations and programs that help children living in poverty, protecting them from abuse and neglect, and ensure their equal rights to assistance and education, a remarkable departure from Amnesty International’s approach.

There is also the Human Rights Action Center, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit organization led by the world-renowned human rights activist and pioneer Jack Healey. The organization works on the issues of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and uses arts and technology to innovate, create and develop new strategies to end human rights violations.

The highly regarded, and often controversial, Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) investigates, exposes, and “brings to justice human rights violations,” and demands that governments and those in power end human rights violations and comply with international standards. The very broad spectrum of demand that HRW leads implies a wide scope of tactics that is borderline aggressive.

Finally, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, an international Jewish-focused human rights organization dedicated to confronting antisemitism, hatred and terrorism, supporting human rights and dignity, standing with Israel. Defending the safety of Jews worldwide and teaching future generations the lessons of the Holocaust often adopts lobbying to present and impose its demands on national and international decision-makers.

Accordingly, examining these groups’ actions and methods, it becomes clear that for these groups to make progress towards achieving justice and protecting human rights, they must operate independently from governments. An element that is generally regarded as an essential component of their credibility and effectiveness. However, there is a critical downside to that independence, as these groups must be financed so they can operate, given that expenses and leveraging of expertise for operations are very expensive on every scale.

1. The Snowball Effect of Funding: The Actual Cost Of Being Financed:

The issue of funds and finance comes from its basic nature and edge in the 21st century.   That is, it is a critical and balancing-shifting tool created by a global exploitation system that is distinguished by its establishing power by limiting and linking tools necessary for prosperity to the interests of those who pose such tools. Bleak as it is, this is a fact that human rights defenders will always experience whenever they seek a tool that is created by a spectrum of interests that is on the other side of theirs. Eventually, by seeking finance from the ‘enemy’, one can always ask a question; what is the actual cost of funds obtained by human rights defenders?

Before answering the question, I must explain the necessity of obtaining funds. Human rights interest groups operate, like any institution, operate based on an annually set budget. An annual budget is set out in one of the many assemblies of the group. These assemblies are also made for collecting donations that comprise the majority of any group of interest’s (especially NGOs) budget.

Moreover, donations usually come from three main sources: donations from individuals; donations from other groups of interest or organizations; and state donations. Hence, a group’s capability to get funded determines its capability to implement more of its demands. Accordingly, the more the source of finance is’ complex ‘and inconsistent with the views of the group, the more the groups’ credibility is questioned. This makes funding a double-edged weapon and the sole determining mechanism of how and when a game of politics is played by a group.

Moreover, the powers and status of the donating party contribute to the complexity of funding, pushing the edge of credibility forward (or backward) into the game of politics. A prime example is set in the case of the billionaire George Soros, the head of the American financial magnate’s Open Society Foundation. Soros had set up a system of influencing strategies that relied on his image as a man of civil society. He endowed it with colossal means to achieve geostrategic and economic objectives, intimately linked to the circles of American power. Soros simply built his colossal fortune in finance and traded a considerable amount of his fortune for the image of a philanthropist with overflowing humanity. As a result, it became necessary for each human rights organization to receive a donation from Soros’ generous vaults to demonstrate how just their cause is.

Nevertheless, a pattern of inconsistencies emerged in the life of George Soros. In 1993, he declared that he would not invest in countries where his foundation operates for transparency and impartiality, but did the exact opposite the following year. He is a strong believer in denouncing corruption and illegal practices and advocates transparency. A remarkable example is him funding NGOs such as Transparency International, while he has an equally remarkable history of avoiding tax audits. He also invested in the coal mining and the oil sectors but espouses the cause of environmental activism.

Soros was dubbed “The Puppet Master” by Margaux Krehl in an article dedicated to him on Vanityfair.fr on October 25, 2018.In her article, Margaux (2018), as I also share her view, wonders whether he is the manipulator that his opponents claim, given the fact that his foundation is associated with many NGOs that operate with the billions he has to offer, and they are many. Since 1984, he has injected more than 30 billion dollars into the Open Society Foundation with the stated ambition of promoting “democratic governance, human rights, and economic, social and legal reforms.” Investigating the “Soros Connection” is like unwinding an endless ball of yarn and realizing the multitude of relays set up by large “flagship NGOs”, which themselves finance, stimulate, and supervise other relays on the ground. HRW is a major beneficiary of Soros’ philanthropy, having received no less than $100 million from Soros’ foundation between 2010 and 2020. HRW is regularly criticized for its close ties to governments and “publications that reflect a lack of professional standards.” HRW also made a revenue of $92.1 million in the 2017-2018 fiscal year, just a year before the death of its founder Robert Bernstein, who served as its president in the Cold War from 1978 to 1988. The very man published an op-ed in the New York Times denouncing his own organization as “morally bankrupt”. HRW ideological biases and moral bankruptcy are the mere products of the many ‘Soroses’ who funded this group. 

No one can accuse these groups of playing a political rather than a humanitarian role. But the fact remains that they bargain for financing with entities with declared “borderless” projects and operate on the ground in several countries with a “free pass”, or even the security of multiple governments. 

With such a stain on the money, any group that is funded by individuals, states, or other organizations that have their own agenda and interests in front, is eventually bound to pay the price of the funds they have received. This is the moment where human rights defenders and groups find themselves bound with a role in the domestic and foreign politics of governments with interests, regardless of whether the rights they defend are actually defended or not.

• How Interest Groups Descended Into Funding-Induced Politics: Distorted Truth:

A group of interest’s descent into the political game does not occur overnight. There are signs that a group of interests has already been poisoned, which usually revolve around the gradual abandonment of the task they hold dear. These signs sound the alarm that a group of interest is on the path of becoming a mere political tool. 

In groups whose work focuses on reporting and acting as watchdogs, a very critical sign is the distortion of reality.Given that situations where credible information may not be available are always present in their scope of work, this is the main characteristic of poisoned humanitarian and human rights-focused NGOs. Naturally, distorted realities are bound to diminish the credibility of groups of interests, with the most famous case being that of Amnesty International’s reporting of the 2019 Iran protests. When reporting the demonstration, Amnesty International reported that “at least 106 demonstrators in 21 cities have been killed, according to credible reports.” However, “reports suggest that up to 200 (people) were killed,” implying that “the true death toll could be much higher. “Amnesty International further issued other press releases as of November 2019 claiming a death toll of 304 over the weeks. As brave and righteous as it seems, the clue of Amnesty’s corruption saw light with its final report released a final report on May 20, 2020, which explicitly stated that Amnesty does not have a list of 304 names, but only 232. Also, the report “used primary sources (friends, relatives, eyewitnesses to each person’s death) in only 127 cases.” A deeper analysis of the report also suggests that Amnesty International only used “eyewitness accounts of each person’s death in only 127 cases, with the remainder consisting mainly of statements by anonymous journalists/activists, most of which were not factual. [1]”

Another example lies in the FEMEN movement’s controversies. Femen, a feminist group of Ukrainian origin founded in Kyiv in 2008 by Anna Hutsol, Oksana Chatchko, and Oleksandra Shevchenko, was the first to protest by stripping naked in the street in front of religious institutions, anywhere.

When Femen decided to take their campaign against Arab Muslim countries in 2013, they began to bombard the “countries with naked women, without reason.” The unfortunate natural outcome was the hyper-sexualized woman object that utterly distorted the global feminist quest and its noble cause. The distortion of reality by FEMEN extends to their effort to cement the status of those who do not share their hyper-sexualized efforts as fascists. This highlights the disparity between the FEMN and the actual feminist quest, as seen when comparing “feminism of the 1970s for women’s sexual freedom” and “feminism of the 2000s for equal pay, parity, and the fight against stereotypes.”Both periods do not claim hyper-sexualization as the scope of both periods’ efforts. 

There are other examples of other NGOs and entities. Nevertheless, the issue remains the same. The capability to distort reality does not stem from mere moral flexibility, but rather from the interest group’s slow descent into funding-induced corruption. It may not always be clear, but the lack of a determined goal or result-orientation is a strong indication that an interest group is a mere puppet in the hands of its finance sources. 

To put this in perspective, I must state that “one feature of activism is that it is distinct from partisan activism. While the former manifests itself episodically and unexpectedly, activism necessitates long-term action within a tightly held hierarchy; while the former defends a specific cause whose legitimacy is self-evident, the latter necessitates adherence to a political ideology that outlines a path to take; and while the former does not pursue any project of radical change of the system of domination, the latter does.When considering these characteristics, it is apparent that corrupt interest groups lack the integrity that comprises any of the types of activism. One can only attribute this lack of integrity to the length they go to fulfil the ‘terms’ of their financing.

• Fulfilling The Terms Of The Agreement: How Playing A Political Role Demotes Human Rights:

Once a group’s image has been completely shattered and its credibility has been shattered, the only remaining action is to move forward and accept the role that the financing sources impose on the group based on interest.

While it could be argued that lack of credibility should end all endeavors of an interest group. One can not deny the role of any interest group in terms of shaping ideologies and presenting facts. To put it in simple terms, discredited groups can still be held as martyrs if they have considerable support from those who can not see beyond their political role. 

A political role, for the purpose of this paper, means using the cause that a group of interests adopts as a pressure tool to indirectly impose the will of the funding sources rather than realizing that goal in itself. The Palestinian cause is a great example to be explained further in this paper.

• The Palestinian Cause:

The latest aggression by the Zionist occupation of Sheikh Jarah has seen many NGOs, states, and individuals calling for action and flooding media channels with stores of heroic actions made by Palestinians, as well as gruesome and horrendous acts committed by the Zionist forces. Nevertheless, many groups of interest showed their true colors when it came to taking a stance on the cause.

I can point out a clear sign that a group is playing a major political role. That is, ‘describing the conflict’. Specialists recall that the expression “Israeli-Palestinian conflict” is “very often mentioned in United Nations resolutions” and is “generally very favorable to the defense of Palestinian rights, for example, those that reaffirm the rights of the Palestinian people.” The International Court of Justice, and its 2004 ruling on the illegality of the wall built by Israel, clearly stated that there was an ‘occupation’. 

Bearing that in mind, it is clear that the cause is being demoted by using generic terms that say nothing about the substance and the horror within the situation. It may be argued that “In practice, this generic aspect is very useful. The term “conflict” is very global and effective in terms of understanding the general theme addressed”. However, these generic terms, by all means, have caused the international community to fail to fathom the reality of the Zionist invasion. This was amplified by interest groups who (either due to their political role or due to unforgivable ignorance) helped cement these weak terms as perceived by the public. Allowing pro-Zionists to profit from a 70-year-old misconception.a misconception that is partially ‘funded’ by those who appreciate the effectiveness of interest groups, whether honest or crooked.

Moreover, the pro-Israeli discourse goes in the direction of inducing the perception of ‘Hamas wanting to attack Israel’. In this regard, and when I investigated Amnesty International’s role in the Palestinian cause, I discovered that it does not discuss it. I also noticed an interesting aspect of Amnesty International’s naming of the cause. Rather than naming it an “Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, it prefers the title “Israel-Occupied Palestinian Territories”: In reality, both terms fail to capture the essence of what is really going on as we only use the term ‘conflict’ when “we refer to armed hostilities”, as explained by Philippe Hensmans, director of the French-speaking Belgian section of Amnesty International. So when there is massive use of weapons, as is the case now in Gaza with rocket fire or airstrikes. This very statement can showcase the bias of Amnesty International, as it refuses to admit that the situation in Palestine is an actual genocide rather than an armed conflict (a term that implies a hint of proportionality between the belligerents). Painting a more realistic picture, I  must note that in relation to the situation in the West Bank, for example, a genuine piece of news can not call any of the events where the Zionist forces obliterate the Palestinian residents an armed conflict as “When there is an armed conflict, the legal framework becomes international humanitarian law, that is to say, the law of war, and therefore the Geneva Conventions.

But when there is an occupation, much broader and more binding human rights apply. It obliges the occupying power to try to arrest rather than kill members of the armed groups who are suspected of carrying out attacks. And to use the minimum necessary force to ensure security. But if the situation turns into an armed conflict, then the law of war applies. ” These very words, true as they are, are still overshadowed by the speaker’s actions (as a representative of Amnesty International) to keep the world from knowing the true horrors experienced in Palestine.

Therefore, it is understandable that for Amnesty International, the choice of words is closely related to its field of action for the defense of human rights. Should or can we use this as a guide for our articles? Would it make sense?

By examining the words of Mehdi Khelfat, an editor of RTBF, I can agree with the fact that: “Amnesty is an NGO that is not supposed to be neutral, it fights for the defense of human rights, that is its role. We are there to tell the facts, to be observers. That’s the big difference between us and her. We are not there to interfere in a conflict. A conflict is what opposes two actors. There is no value judgment. Afterward, we can talk about the reality of the facts as they are, talk about the blockade, make the people who suffer from it testify”[2]. It is very clear that Amnesty International has long forgotten its role as a human rights defending group and decided to imply the oppressing zionist policy of demoting action and spreading ignorance of the situation.

Conclusion:

The loop of politics will never end, so long that the governments and individuals who suffer from the ‘funding poison’ are incapable of taking swift and critical actions to protect themselves from the corruption of ‘funded’ organizations. This protection represents an advantage over unknown monetary funds, but it also has its disadvantages.

One of the countries that had a debate about foreign funding of organizations in Egypt where precautions based on the fact that these human rights organizations are politicized, were taken. These precautions have led to a great discovery of how humanitarian and philanthropic work is deemed meaningless if politicized. Egypt’s precautions sparked a non-formal debate between activists, journalists, and the government, which is very concerned that the organizations determine their funding because it is clear that if an interest group’s funding becomes fragile and pervasive, there is a high possibility that their political role will cease.

I must note that it is currently impossible to discuss the subject of human rights NGOs in Egypt without someone mentioning the word funding.

Many opinions are put on the table, as the government does not deny humanitarian activities, nor does it directly deny funding. The problem lies in the identity of those who provide funds (i.e. organizations located in the West) and Egypt’s relationship with them.

The suspicious foreign base of human rights organizations puts them in the circle of accusation and creates a barrier between the NGO itself and its essential purpose, the protection of human rights.

Finally, I must note that to protect themselves and their citizens, governments are obliged to refuse any action on their territory, which may be unknown and suspicious.

The concept of human rights is not of moral origin, but a specific modality of the modern concept of subjective rights. These human rights have by nature a legal character. To protect this right from any violation, it is necessary to monitor the supervisors as we can never eliminate groups of interests who fight for human rights, but we must ensure that they never become the tyrants they seek to overthrow.

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[1] https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-93996-4_303
International Encyclopedia of Civil Society
2010 Edition | Editors: Helmut K. Anheier, Stefan Toepler

[2] https://cercle-condorcet-de-paris.org/
Analyse de Mehdi Khelfat (JT du 06/11/2020).